Abstract-This paper uses firm-level survey data matched with official tax records to estimate the unobserved true sales of formal firms in Mongolia. Taking into account firm-level incentives to comply with taxes and a production function technology linking unobserved true sales with observable firm-level production characteristics, we derive a multipleindicators, multiple-causes model predicting true sales. We find that firms underreport sales to the tax office by 38.6%, but firm-level survey data also suffer from significant underreporting. Finally, we compare our approach with two alternative approaches of measuring underreporting and discuss the practical implications of the findings for firm-level analyses of underreporting.
1
Of course, researchers have been well aware that firms may have an incentive to misreport their activities, for reasons such as high marginal tax rates, corruption, and crime (Johnson et al., 2000; Dabla-Norris & Koeda, 2008; Gatti & Honorati, 2008) . Firm-level studies on underreporting of firm sales or output often rely on self-reported measures of underreporting by firms, formulated in terms of the typical behavior of a firm in the same area of activity. The fact that these studies often report a sizable degree of underreporting, together with intuitive correlations with observable firm and investment climate characteristics, suggests that these selfreported measures capture underreporting to some degree. However, it remains unclear how reliable these measures are without further probing the underlying assumption that firms report truthfully about untruthful reporting. Firm-level studies that do not specifically focus on informality or misreporting almost always assume that firms report truthfully or that firm-level measures suffer from classical measurement error only. However, to the extent that misreporting behavior is systematically related to (observable or unobservable) firm-level and investment climate characteristics for which the analysis does not control adequately, the reported results will suffer from systematic, and unknown, measurement error bias. Also if one relies on survey rather than tax office data in the analysis, it is not clear to what extent the survey data suffer less from misreporting than official tax data.
Using unique firm-level survey data matched with official tax data, we attempt to estimate the unobserved true sales and the underreporting in sales to the tax office of formal sector firms in Mongolia. Following the shadow economy literature, we distinguish among three possible ways of estimating this underreporting. 3 The direct approach is a microapproach that uses surveys to reveal the extent of underreporting directly. Respondents are either randomly sampled or selected as part of tax auditing or other compliance methods. For instance, the (P)ICS and BEEPS surveys include a question that is typically formulated along the following lines: ''Recognizing the difficulties many firms face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of total annual sales would you estimate the typical firm in your area of business reports for tax purposes?'' Together with other information collected on the respondent's behavior and environment, these sample surveys provide rich information about underreporting and its correlates but are sensitive to the formulation of questionnaires and largely depend on the respondents' willingness to cooperate. Tax auditing methods may be better able to extract truthful information from the auditees, but tax authorities may not be able to fully discover the true incomes of the audited group. Moreover, the audited group is typically a biased sample of the population (Schneider & Enste, 2000) .
The second type of approach is the indirect or indicator approach and has been primarily used in macroeconomic settings. The approach consists of constructing indicators that reflect the development of shadow economy over time, such as the discrepancy between national expenditure and income statistics or between official and actual labor force. The quality of the approach therefore depends on the accuracy of these indicators and may be seriously affected by measurement errors and systematic underreporting in the indicators (Giles, 1999; Schneider & Enste, 2000) .
The third approach to estimating the extent of underreporting is the model approach. This approach was introduced into economics by Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984) in their study of the size of the hidden economy of a cross-section of seventeen OECD countries for the period 1960 to 1978, and has been used in several other studies (Loayza, 1996; Chaudhuri, Schneider, & Chattopadhyay, 2006; Dell'Anno, Gomez-Antonio, & Pardo, 2007) . The approach is based on structural equation modeling with latent variables, for which multiple causes and multiple indicators exist (MIMIC model). The empirical MIMIC literature is primarily macroeconomic in nature, and typically the specification of the applied MIMIC model is not derived from formal economic theory. One notable exception is a paper by Siegel (1997) , which uses a MIMIC model derived from formal economic theory to estimate the contribution of computer use in productivity growth at the industry level.
This paper makes a number of contributions. First, because we have unique firm-level survey data matched with official tax data, we can apply and compare these three approaches simultaneously for the same sample of firms. Second, unlike most of the other MIMIC literature, we use formal economic theory to derive a MIMIC model to estimate the size of hidden outputs using microeconomic data. In particular, we model true sales by taking into account firm-level incentives to comply with taxes and a production function technology linking true sales with observable firm-level production characteristics. Third, we allow for underreporting not only in the official tax office data but also in the survey data. Fourth, we estimate the extent of underreporting for a sample of formal sector firms in the transition economy of Mongolia where the extent of underreporting is expected to be prevalent but largely unknown.
4 While our findings are for a transition economy, they should be relevant for many countries, both developing and developed, as underreporting is a generally observed phenomenon around the world (see section II).
We will argue that the MIMIC approach provides a more accurate estimate of the extent of underreporting than the direct and indirect approaches because it incorporates firmlevel incentives to comply with taxes and a production function technology linking true sales with observable firmlevel production characteristics, it controls for measurement errors, and it allows for underreporting in both official tax and survey data. According to the MIMIC approach, the average percentage of underreporting to the tax office is 38.6% at the firm level and 37.5% at the aggregate for the population of firms from which the sample has been drawn. The indirect approach performs poorly and underestimates underreporting because it is sensitive to measurement errors and underreporting in the survey data. The direct approach gives an estimate of the firm-level average percentage of underreporting, which is somewhat lower than the MIMIC approach, confirming the conjecture of Schneider and Enste (2000) that the direct approach provides a lower bound for true underreporting. However, the direct approach gives an estimate that is too high for aggregate underreporting because of measurement error and appears less useful as an indicator of underreporting by individual firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we discuss the extent of underreporting by firms around the world based on the commonly used self-reported measures of underreporting (direct approach). In section III, we provide a formal derivation of a MIMIC model to estimate the true sales of a firm. In section IV we discuss the empirical specification of the model and present the empirical results. Section V concludes with a comparison of the MIMIC results with those from direct and indirect approaches and discusses the practical implications of the findings.
II. Underreporting by Firms around the World: The Direct Approach
While most of the existing empirical research on the unofficial economy uses macrodata, a number of recent papers have used firm-level survey data to analyze the determinants and consequences of underreporting of sales or output by firms (Johnson et al., 2000; Gatti & Honorati, 2008) . These papers take advantage of the increasing availability of large-scale and comparable firm-level surveys in which firms have been asked about their tax reporting behavior, such as in the BEEPS, (P)ICS, and WBES surveys. Because the firms in these surveys are typically registered, the papers analyze informal activity by otherwise formal (registered) firms using the so-called direct approach.
Because of the sensitive nature of the subject, the question about reporting behavior is phrased in terms of actions of ''typical firms in your area of activity'': ''Recognizing the difficulties many enterprises face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of total sales would you estimate the typical establishment in your area of activity reports for tax purposes?'' Researchers have explicitly or implicitly interpreted firms' responses to this question as indicators of underreporting at the firm level.
These studies often report a sizable degree of underreporting together with intuitive correlations with observable firm and investment climate characteristics. This suggests that these self-reported measures do capture underreporting at least to some degree. Moreover, Johnson et al. (2000) also note that the estimates of hidden activity from the surveys are quite similar to those available from two independent macro methodologies.
5 This suggests that the direct approach based on firm-level surveys provides useful information about actual underreporting behavior by firms.
In figure 1 we plot the mean of underreporting by firms based on the direct approach across countries sorted by (log) GDP per capita in 2005. We used all BEEPS, (P)ICS, WBES, and Firm Analysis and Competitiveness Surveys (FACS) for 2005 or later that could be freely accessed through the World Bank website and that included information on self-reported underreporting in sales. 6 In case multiple surveys were available for a given country, we selected the most recent one. Figure 1 shows a clear pattern that the mean level of underreporting is decreasing in log of GDP per capita. Underreporting is the highest across the lowincome countries and the lowest across the high-income and OECD countries. 7 However, even at comparable levels of income, there is a large variation in the extent of underreporting by firms across countries, which may reflect genuine country differences in underreporting behavior, as well as measurement errors.
Because the survey asks about the underreporting by typical firms in the same area of activity, there may be a ''bias towards the average behavior of other firms in that environment '' (Dabla-Norris & Koeda, 2008, p. 10) as firms may report the average amount of underreporting for firms in the same industry. Also they may report the average amount of underreporting as they perceive in their locality. We therefore calculated the percent of the variance in reported underreporting that can be explained by location and industry effects (variance 1 in figure 1 ). If firms report the average amount of underreporting for firms in the same industry or locality, then a major part of the observed variance in reported underreporting would be captured by location, industry, and interaction effects. For the low-income countries, the percentage explained is 26.1% on average; for the lower-and upper-middle-income countries, this is 27.6% and 28.7%, respectively; and for the high-income and OECD countries, they are 56.5% and 23%, respectively. Hence, it appears that a major part of the variance in reported underreporting can be explained by differences in mean reporting of firms active in different industries or localities.
8 But only a small part of the variance appears to be correlated with firm-level characteristics once we control for industry and location-specific effects. Variance 2 in fig- The figure shows that the firm-level characteristics of firm size and ownership explain a small percentage of the observed variance once we control for the variation across industries and locations. Variance 1 is uniformly much larger than variance 2. Although one might also include other firm-level characteristics besides firm size and ownership, there are no obvious other firm-level variables that will be able to explain much more of the total variance. Therefore, the largest part of the explained variance in reported underreporting appears to be across industries and localities rather than across firms within industries and localities. This suggests that the responses are indeed biased toward the average behavior of other firms in the environment, making them less indicative of underreporting by individual firms.
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There remains, however, the important issue of whether the direct approach provides reliable information, even if only about average underreporting behavior. It has been noted that the direct approach may provide a lower-bound estimate of actual underreporting (Schneider & Enste, 2000) . The direct approach relies on the untested assumption that firms report truthfully about untruthful reporting, but this may not hold in practice. Therefore, in the next section, we develop an alternative approach that allows for (systematic and nonsystematic) misreporting in the survey and estimates underreporting at the firm level.
III. A MIMIC Model
We derive a MIMIC model to estimate the true sales of a firm, taking into account firm-level incentives to comply with taxes and a production function technology linking true sales with observable firm-level production characteristics. 
. If e and u are jointly normally distributed, maximum likelihood can be applied to estimate the parameters of the model. 10 The MIMIC model has been applied to estimate the demand for health care (Van de Ven & Van der Gaag, 1982) , manufacturing productivity growth (Siegel 1997) , and the 2008 financial crisis (Rose & Spiegel, 2010) , apart from the shadow economy literature mentioned in section I.
Our MIMIC model is more general than the standard model. First, we allow for any correlation between e and u, and among u (E eu 0 À Á 6 ¼ 0 and H 2 nondiagonal). Second, we allow indicators to depend on both the latent variable and other factors. And third, we allow for truncation given that sales from tax records (an indicator) should not exceed the true sales of the firm (the latent variable). We discuss the derivations of our structural equation and two measurement equations for the MIMIC model next.
A. Structural Equation
Assume that the production technology of a firm can be represented by a Cobb-Douglas production function,
where Y, A, M, L, and K represent output, total factor productivity, raw material, labor, and capital inputs, respectively; a, b, and g are the elasticity of production for the three inputs and p, p M , w, and r are the prices of output, raw material, labor, and capital respectively. Since our data on inputs and output are in values, we rewrite equation (3) (in log linear form) as: 
reflecting the impact of prices and productivity on the value of output. In the short run, capital is fixed and firms maximize profits with respect to raw material and labor inputs, taking input prices as given. Substituting the profit-maximizing levels of M and L into equation (4), we obtain an expression for the optimal (log) sales (S*):
The capital service flow variable K V is taken as a weighted average of the values of capital stocks such as machinery and equipment, vehicles, and buildings (Christensen & Jorgensen, 1969) ;
where K B and d B are the stock values of and the depreciation rate for buildings, and K ME and d ME are the stock values of and the depreciation rate for machinery, equip-9 Unless one assumes that underreporting behavior is mostly uncorrelated with observable firm characteristics. 10 For more details of the MIMIC model identification and estimation, see Joreskog and Goldberger (1975) . 11 We assume firms do not have inventory so that output is equal to sales.
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12
Price and productivity dispersion is well documented in the literature (Bartelsman & Doms, 2000) but often unknown to researchers. Therefore, the intercept lnm is unknown but can be approximated by a vector of firm characteristics (X 1 ) such as firm location, industry, size, ownership structure, and investment climate constraints that firms face (such as corruption and regulation burden). Hence equation (5) can be written as
with parameters a, b, and c. The disturbance u captures either measurement errors or productivity shocks or other unobserved effects that are not captured by X 1 . Equation (7) is the structural equation for unobserved (''true'') sales (latent variable) and can be viewed as a short-run supply function.
B. First Measurement Equation for Tax Office Data: Tax Compliance Model
Two types of indicators are available for the latent variable true sales: one from the official tax data and one from the firm-level survey data. Both are required for identification purposes. Sales data from tax records are potentially a valuable indicator for unobserved true sales. However, they do not form unbiased estimators of true sales because there are strong incentives for firms to reduce the tax burden by underreporting.
We formulate a simple tax compliance model to derive a relationship between the sales from tax records and the true sales.
13 One of the earliest and best-known models of tax evasion is that of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) , where the individual taxpayer's decision on the level of tax compliance is subject to an exogenous and positive audit probability and a penalty when evasion is detected. Later extensions of the model include endogenous labor supply and audit probabilities, allowances for repeated interactions between taxpayer and tax office, and taxpayer attitude and social dynamics (Reinganum & Wilde, 1985; Graetz, Reinganum, & Wilde, 1986; Grasmick & Bursick, 1990; Erard & Feinstein, 1994) . There is also a small literature on corporate tax evasion (Crocker & Slemrod, 2005; Chen & Chu, 2005) .
Firms have incentives to underreport taxable incomes through underreporting in sales or overreporting in raw material costs. Meanwhile, firms can either overreport labor costs to reduce taxable incomes or underreport to reduce payroll tax, depending on the relative costs of the two. Tax evasion, however, is associated with uncertainty and incurs extra costs. For example, firms have to invest extra resources to make ''double accounts,'' and under-the-counter transactions might hinder firms from fully utilizing public services such as legal and judicial systems and access to formal finance. We assume the extra cost associated with tax evasion to be a fixed proportion d of the amount of profits underreported 14 and that firms choose an optimal combination of sales, raw materials, and labor costs reported to the tax office for retained profit maximization, taking into account the costs and benefits associated with tax evasion.
Firms know that only a fraction of firms will be selected for tax audits due to the tax authority's budget constraints. We formulate the subjective probabilities of detection h i for underreporting (or overreporting) in sales, raw materials, and labor costs as
where h i 2 0; 1 ½ ; i ¼ S; M; L, with h the firm's subjective perception of tax office efficiency. The detection probabilities increase with the relative gap between true and reported values. We further assume that once a firm is chosen for tax auditing, any tax evasion will be detected, and the true output and inputs of the firm will be fully revealed. 16 Therefore, a firm maximizes the expected selfretained profit with respect to reported sales, raw materials, and labor costs, taking true values as given:
where p; s; s L ; and P denote a firm's retained profit, corporate profit tax rate, payroll tax rate, and penalty multiplier, respectively. 17 Plugging the three audit probabilities into equation (8), we obtain three first-order conditions with respect to
12 Hours worked per capital are a good proxy for capital service flow, but we do not have such data. 13 The model is constructed purely from a firm's perspective without modeling the strategic interaction between the firm and tax authority because information on the tax authority is lacking.
Þdenote the true (tax office) sales/raw materials/labor costs, respectively; thus, the profit underreported is equal to
The three probabilities are mutually uncorrelated. Our specification also restricts raw materials to be overreported. However, we have verified that it is possible to relax both restrictions, and the same implied relationship between true and reported values still holds under suitable assumptions. 16 Assuming partial detection of the underreporting does not change the main implications of the model. 17 In 2003 the profit tax rates were 15% and 40% in Mongolia with a cutoff point of MNT 100 million. No firms in the tax record have taxable incomes above the threshold. The taxable incomes could be lower if there are other tax-deductible costs not included in the calculation, so assuming a single profit tax rate is reasonable. Also the payroll tax rate is flat-formal firms in Mongolia are obliged to pay 19% social security tax on wages or a slightly higher rate (or 20% and 21% in some industries with high injury risks). 
MEASURING TRUE SALES AND UNDERREPORTING
The marginal effects of s; P; d, and h on sales are
Reported sales increase with the penalty multiplier, probability of audit, detection efficiency, and costs associated with misreporting, but decrease with corporate income tax rate. The patterns conform to our expectation and are in line with the predictions derived from other tax compliance models. The unknown parameters P; d; h, and s (if interpreted as an unobserved and firm-specific effective tax rate) can be linearly approximated by observable variables in vector X 2 (see section IV),
where e t denotes all unobserved effects that are not captured by X 2 but cause S t to deviate from true sales. Equations (7) and (10) form a MIMIC model with one latent variable, one indicator, and one constraint ln S t ln S Ã . In appendix B in the online supplement we show that the model remains underidentified (without imposing additional identification restrictions), and therefore we need at least one more indicator (measurement equation) for model identification. 19 Without an obvious economic theory to explain (mis)reporting behavior in the PICS survey, we assume a standard loglinear measurement error model linking reported sales in the survey (S s ) and true sales (S*) (the firm knows its true sales at the time of the survey):
with parameters, d 2 and b 2 and measurement error e s . The reported sales are expected to be positively correlated with true sales ðb 2 > 0Þ. 20 The log-linear specification is flexible as it allows the survey sales to be either above or below the true sales.
Summarizing, equations (7), (10), and (11) 
In line with the MIMIC literature, we assume u; e t ; e s to be multivariate normally distributed with zero mean but allow for any correlation among the error terms. (In appendix B we discuss the identification of the model and derive the likelihood function for estimation.)
IV. Estimated True Sales versus Reported Sales
The data for this study are from Mongolia, a landlocked country in East and Central Asia that has gone through radical changes from central planning toward a market economy in the 1990s. During this period, the informal economy has grown rapidly, and the average size of the shadow economy was estimated to be about 20% of GDP between 1999 and 2003 (Schneider, 2006 21 The coverage rates of the number of firms in the four sectors are 81%, 70%, 56%, and 53%, respectively. The PICS survey data are matched at the firm level with the second source of data: the firms' tax reports submitted to the Mongolia tax office.
As a first shot at measuring the extent of underreporting by survey firms, we report the firms' responses to the ques-18 S t S Ã if s > d (the tax rate is higher than the marginal cost of tax evasion), and S t > 0 as long as h is not too small. 19 See section IV and appendix A for more information on the survey. 20 Rewriting equation (11) 
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS tion, ''What % of total sales the typical establishment in your area of activity reports for tax purposes?'' across city, industry and firm size (table 1). Firms report that the typical firm on average underreports 37.6% of its sales. Although underreporting in Erdenet is higher compared to Darkhan and Hovd, the differences among the other three cities and across industry and firm size are not significant.
22
Our second shot at measuring underreporting is based on the so-called indirect approach by interpreting the discrepancy of the reported sales from the survey and tax record as underreporting.
23 Figure 2 shows the cumulative density functions for the sales reported to the tax office and in the survey. The distribution of sales reported in the survey firstorder stochastically dominates the distribution of sales from official tax data. This implies that the total tax actually paid to the tax office is less than the total tax that should have been paid if taxes actually paid increase monotonically in sales from tax record. Table 2 reports the extent of underreporting in sales to the tax office by the indirect approach. Estimated underreporting averages about 15% and is much smaller than revealed by the direct approach (table 1) . This approach suffers from serious measurement error or underreporting in the survey sales as we observe 96 negative values.
The MIMIC approach has three main advantages over the direct and indirect approaches. First, it uses more information by incorporating firm-level incentives to comply with taxes and a production function model linking true sales with observable firm-level production characteristics. Second, the MIMIC model allows for measurement errors in sales reported in the survey and to the tax office. And third, the model allows for underreporting not only to the tax office but also in the survey. 
MEASURING TRUE SALES AND UNDERREPORTING

A. Estimated MIMIC Model
Vectors X 1 and X 2 in the MIMIC model are used to approximate for price and productivity differences across firms ðlnlÞ and for the unknown parameters P, d h, and t in the tax compliance model, respectively. We discuss the selection of variables into X 1 and X 2 below (see appendix A in the online supplement for a definition of the variables).
First, firm size, city, and sector dummies are related to firm productivity and tax-reporting behavior (Dabla-Norris, Gradstein, & Inchuauste, 2008) and are included in both X 1 and X 2 . Larger firms may be more productive than small firms and have more bargaining power to obtain favorable input and output prices; large firms may underreport relatively less than small firms because the former are subject to more public supervision; different cities have different regulatory environments that affect both firm productivity and tax reporting behaviors; firms may have different perceptions over local tax office efficiency.
Firms with higher capacity utilization, more experienced managers, and a more skilled labor force tend to be more productive, and their corresponding proxies (respectively, caputi, manexp, lmwage) are therefore also included in X 1 . Because underreporting opportunities may also vary with the skill intensity of production and more experienced managers may be more adept in reducing the tax burden when dealing with the tax office, the proxies for average skill intensity (lmwage) and management experience (manexp) are also included in X 2 .
Finally, proxies for investment climate (IC) constraints such as tax burden, corruption, regulatory burden, and credit constraints that affect both firm performance and taxreporting behavior of firms (Pommerehne & Weck-Hannemann, 1996; Johnson et al., 2000; Dollar et al., 2005) should be included in X 1 and X 2 . Our data do not have information on tax burden. A corruption dummy (¼ 1(0) if a firm has (not) paid bribes or provided informal gifts in 2003) and a credit dummy (¼ 1 if a firm faces a constraint to formal credit such as bank loans and overdraft) are included. Proxies for regulatory burden, such as the number of visits by agency inspectors, time spent dealing with regulations by management, and number of licenses, have also been considered. 24 But their estimated coefficients appeared small and insignificant (also jointly) and hence were dropped from X 1 and X 2 .
Actually, if we include in X 1 all of the above variables simultaneously, we run into a multicollinearity issue with inflated standard errors. Dropping one or more variables increases the log likelihood dramatically. In our final specifications, we therefore drop variables with small and insignificant coefficients (also jointly) from X 1 (for example, city dummies, lmwage and manexp). We do note that dropping these variables does not affect the estimated coefficients of the retained variables much.
We are aware of the possible endogeneity problem with the IC variables. 25 Firms may pay bribes to get away with underreporting and firms with larger official sales may have more access to finance than firms with smaller official sales. Dollar et al. (2005) proposed replacing the IC variables with the their city-industry averages to reduce any possible endogeneity bias.
26 When using the same strategy, we found inflated estimates for size and industry dummies due to severe collinearity problems. 27 On the other hand, including the IC dummies directly in the regression does not affect the estimated parameters of the other variables 24 The quality of government institutions and legal systems also affects informality (Pommerehne & Weck-Hannemann, 1996; Loayza, 1996; Johnson et al., 2000; . 25 One of the referees noted that the lmwage variable may also be endogeneous if firms overreport wages to avoid taxes. We agree that this might indeed be an issue, but it would be even more complicated to model misreporting in sales and wages simultaneously. However, endogeneity of the lmwage variable should be less of a concern in our analysis for two reasons. First, the incentive to overreport wages (to reduce profit tax) is counteracted (to some extent at least) by the incentive to underreport wages (to reduce payroll taxes). Second, we minimize any possible bias by calculating the lmwage variable from the survey rather than from the tax records, as misreporting to the tax office appears to be much more of an issue than misreporting in the survey (based on our analysis for reported sales).
26 Dollar et al. (2005) also note that even the city-sector averages will not be exogenous if more efficient firms self-select to locations with better climate and the analysis does not fully control for all the forces driving the self-selection behaviors. 27 We have also tried replacing our objective IC dummies by subjective measures on the severity of IC constraints (using a Likert scale), but this does not improve the collinearity problem.
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS much. This suggests that possible endogeneity bias, if any, is limited to the estimated coefficients of the IC dummies. Table 3 reports the maximum likelihood estimates for the MIMIC model. 28 Panel A presents the results for the structural equation with dependent variable ln(S*), equation (7) and panels B and C show the results for the two measurement equations with dependent variables log of sales from tax record and survey, respectively, equations (10) and (11). Panel D provides the multivariate normality tests on the residuals, overidentifying tests, and likelihood ratio (goodness-of-fit) tests. Column 1 shows the results without IC variables, columns 2 and 3 add credit and corruption respectively, and column 4 adds both. Notice that we drop the constant d 1 in equation (10) because it was found to be insignificant.
Panel A shows the estimates for the structural equation for the latent variable (''true'') sales. The coefficients for the three industry dummies suggest that true sales in construction, service, and tourism are, respectively, 32%, 26%, and 172% higher than in manufacturing (column 4), 29 although only tourism appears significant. The coefficients for medium and large are both significant at the 5% level, implying that medium-and large-size firms produce almost 0.7 and 2.5 times more than small firms, respectively, holding everything else constant. Moreover, firms' sales increase with capital and capacity utilization. The dummies credit and corruption control for the impact of the investment climate constraint on productivity and prices. The impact of credit is negative and significant, implying that firms with credit constraint produce 27.5% less than firms without the constraint. The proxy for corruption burden has an unexpected positive sign but is small and insignificant.
Panels B and C show the results of the two measurement equations with indicators ln S t (log of tax record sales) and ln S s (log of survey sales). Without underreporting, the coefficients in panel B should be 0 (except for ln S*), while in panel C, the coefficient of ln S* should be equal to 1 and the constant should be 0. But most coefficients in panels B and C are significantly different from 0 (different from one for ln S* in panel C) but with the expected signs. Therefore, underreporting in sales exists and also varies across firms.
All of the parameter estimates for the impacts of variables on sales reported to the tax office in panel B are obtained conditional on true sales ln S*, and the marginal effects of the variables should be interpreted accordingly. 
MEASURING TRUE SALES AND UNDERREPORTING
Firms in construction report significantly more to the tax office than firms in the manufacturing sector, ceteris paribus. Also medium and large firms report significantly more, with everything else equal. The parameter estimates for the cities Darkhan, Erdenet, and Hovd are all negative and significant, and hence firms outside Ulaanbaatar report significantly lower sales to the tax office. Moreover, firms with a higher average skill level also report significantly larger sales compared to other firms, while firms with more experienced managers tend to report lower sales to the tax office. Both investment climate dummies appear small and insignificant; hence, we do not have evidence that credit constraints and corruption burden affect underreporting to the tax office at given levels of true sales.
Panel C shows the results for the measurement equation using the estimated sales from the survey as indicator.
30
The coefficient for ln S* is 0.66 and significantly different from 0 and 1 at the 5% level. Therefore, survey sales are significantly and positively correlated with true sales. The estimated coefficient of 0.66 does not necessarily imply underreporting, however, as the constant term is also positive and significant at the 5% level, and for small values of true sales, this would suggest overreporting. However, based on the estimated conditional predictions of the firms' true sales (see the next section), 74% of the firms are found to underreport sales in the survey.
The MIMIC model assumes a multivariate normal distribution for the disturbances. When this assumption is violated, the estimated parameter values from truncated maximum likelihood estimation become inconsistent (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005) . We test the multivariate normality assumption on the reduced-form MIMIC model residuals with the results shown in panel D. The (asymptotic) multivariate normality tests are not rejected. We have also estimated the MIMIC model with different choices for the capital return and depreciation rates used in the calculation of the capital variable (equation [6] ), and we find that our results are robust with respect to plausible alternative parameter choices.
Our MIMIC model is overidentified with KÀ1 degrees of freedom.
31 One can test for overidentification by adding KÀ1 nonzero elements e n to the reduced-form equations and test for their joined significance (equation [18] in appendix B). But in this case, the maximum likelihood does not converge. More specifically, if the parameters for the sector, size, and location dummies (plus capacity utilization for columns 1 and 2) are nonzero, the maximum likelihood does not converge. This is not surprising given that we estimate a relatively complicated structural model with a limited sample of 231 observations and many dummy variables. We therefore apply a partial overidentification test by excluding the restrictions involving the sector, size, and city dummies (plus capacity utilization for columns 1 and 2). Panel D of table 3 presents the overidentifying tests for the different specifications of the model with the corresponding degrees of freedom. In none of the specifications are the overidentification restrictions rejected, suggesting that the MIMIC restrictions are not overly restrictive.
We also calculate the likelihood ratio index (or pseudo-R 2 ) as a measure of goodness of fit, given by LRI = 1 À lnL lnL 0 (McFadden, 1974) , with lnL 0 the log likelihood for a model with a constant only. The LRIs are all above .3, indicating a reasonable model fit.
32
B. Prediction of True Sales
The main objective of this paper is to estimate a firm's true sales and therefore the extent of underreporting in sales to the tax office and in the survey. Prediction of the true sales in the MIMIC model can be done conditional on either the causal variables only or on both causal variables and the indicators.
33 Previous MIMIC empirical literature predicts the latent variables conditional on the causal variables only (Giles, 1999; Chaudhuri et al., 2006; Dell'Anno et al., 2007) . In order to increase precision, we choose to predict conditional on both the causal variables and the indicators and calculate E S Ã jX; Underreporting to the tax office is on average larger than in the survey (38.6% versus 11.9%). With respect to underreporting to the tax office, firms that are located in Darkhan or Erdenet (46.6% and 46.2%) and firms that pay bribes or provided informal gifts when dealing with government authorities (41.9%) tend to underreport significantly more than other firms. Medium firms significantly underreport less than small firms (37.4% versus 42.8%). Also, and surprisingly, firms in the construction sector tend to underreport significantly less (33.9%) than in manufacturing 30 We have tried specifications including various firm characteristics in panel C similar to panel B, but all of the coefficients are small and insignificant.
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and it equals 12 for column 1, 13 for columns 2 and 3, and 14 for column 4. See appendix B for details on the overidentification of the model. We are grateful to one of the referees for pointing this out to us. 32 Also diagnostic statistics such as RMSEA, AGFI, CFI, and TLI are often jointly calculated to evaluate the fit of the MIMIC model. These fit indices are calculated based on the difference between sample (S) and model R ð Þ implied covariances. The closer this difference is to 0, the better the fit is evaluated (because the fitting functions or discrepancy functions F S; R ð Þ are equal to 0 whenever S ¼ S; see Schermelleh-Engel, Moosbrugger, & Müller, 2003) . However, unlike the standard (and linear) MIMIC model, our model is nonlinear due to truncation. Hence, the closeness of the sample and model implied covariances does not necessarily imply a good fit as it also depends on the truncation part of the log likelihood.
33 Joreskog and Goldberger (1975) derived the formula for prediction conditional on both X and Y. We modify their formula to incorporate the inequality constraint. Besides, we normalize
For the exact derivation of this conditional expectation, see appendix C in the online supplement.
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS (42.4%). Firms facing credit constraints underreport slightly more on average than firms without such constraint, but the difference is not significant (39.9% versus 37.8%).
We also observe underreporting in the survey, albeit at a lower level. Underreporting in the survey is especially high for firms in Darkhan and Erdenet (23.2% and 24.8%) , in the tourism sector (37.6%), and for large firms (32.7%). The high level of underreporting for firms in Darkhan and Edernet may reflect the perceived lower quality of the survey team in these locations. 35 The high level of underreporting in the survey by large firms may be explained by the fact that the estimated sales are based on the three main products while large firms are more likely to have more than three product lines. Underreporting is also relatively high for firms that pay bribes or provided informal gifts when dealing with government authorities (15.2%) and for firms that are not credit constrained (17.0%). Table 4 shows the bivariate relationship between underreporting behavior and firm characteristics (and investment climate constraints). It is useful to investigate which of the factors affect underreporting most. Therefore, we also did a descriptive regression analysis with underreporting to the tax office as the dependent variable and firm characteristics and the IC constraints as independent variables, allowing for heteroskedasticity. 36 The resulting regression shows that the size effect of underreporting disappears with the inclusion of other variables. Firms with more capital underreport significantly less, while corruption and credit constraint increase underreporting. Also, firms outside Ulaanbaatar tend to underreport more-but less if they are active in the construction sector.
Finally we calculated the percent of aggregate sales underreported to the tax office and in the survey. Aggregate underreporting is 37.5% to the tax office and 22.8% in the survey. These figures are respectively lower and higher than the mean firm-level underreporting reported in table 4 because underreporting decreases in firms size for sales reported to the tax office but increases for sales reported in the survey.
V. Discussion
We have used matched firm-level survey and official tax data to estimate the true sales and the extent of underreporting in sales by formal firms in Mongolia. We explored three approaches: a direct approach, an indirect approach, and a modeling (MIMIC) approach. These approaches have been applied widely in the shadow economy literature but primarily for macrodata (with the indirect and modeling approach) and without a proper economic foundation for the MIMIC approach.
We argue that our MIMIC approach provides a relatively more accurate estimate of underreporting relative to the direct approach because it incorporates firm-level incentives to comply with taxes and a production function technology linking true sales with observable firm-level production characteristics. It also controls for measurement errors and allows for underreporting in both official tax and survey data. Table 5 compares the results from the three approaches.
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In total, we have 187 firms for which we have an estimate of underreporting from each of the approaches. 38 At the 38 To check whether a sample selection effect is driving the comparison of the three approaches, we regress the estimated underreporting from, respectively, the direct, indirect, and MIMIC approach on a dummy that equals 1 if the firm is among the common sample of 187 firms. A significant dummy coefficient would imply a common sample selection effect, but we find that the coefficients for the dummy are small and insignificant in all three regressions. 573 MEASURING TRUE SALES AND UNDERREPORTING firm level, we rank firms into four quantiles based on sales from the survey. All firms underreport to some extent with the MIMIC approach, whereas almost 25% report zero underreporting with the direct approach (44 out of the 187 firms). The high frequency of zero underreporting with the direct approach is suspicious in Mongolia, as the carefully formulated survey question asks about the reporting behavior of the ''typical establishment in your area of activity'' while underreporting is a common problem and almost a norm for firms. The pattern of underreporting is similar to the direct and MIMIC approach across the four quantiles, and it is the lowest in the first quantile and the highest in the fourth quantile. However, underreporting with the direct approach is uniformly lower than with the MIMIC approach (although the differences are not statistically significant possibly because of the relatively small sample sizes).
The indirect approach gives the smallest estimates of underreporting to the tax office (at both the firm level and aggregate). This low estimate reflects the sensitivity of the indirect approach to measurement error. 39 It also suffers from underreporting in the survey (see table 4 ). The relatively high estimate for aggregate underreporting with the direct approach follows from the fact that the predicted true sales in the direct approach are calculated by dividing the reported tax office sales of a firm by the percentage of sales the ''typical establishment'' reports to the tax office according to the same firm. Consequently a higher reported percentage of underreporting gives a higher estimate of true sales for the same firm and therefore is weighted more in the calculation of aggregate underreporting.
40
In section 2 we noted that estimated underreporting with the direct approach may be biased toward the average reporting behavior of firms. The MIMIC approach incorporates firm-level incentives to comply with taxes as well as a firm-level production function technology to estimate underreporting. We have checked whether the MIMIC estimates show more variation across firm characteristics than those based on the direct approach (after controlling for location and industry effects). 41 For the common sample of 187 firms, firm characteristics explain 9.2% of the total variation with the direct approach and 9.4% with the MIMIC approach. If we drop the questionable observations indicating no underreporting with the direct approach, the variance explained by firm characteristics drops to 4.1% for the direct approach against 7.1% for the MIMIC approach. Hence, the direct approach appears to be less informative on the underreporting of individual firms than the MIMIC approach.
An important implication is that analyses of firm-level underreporting using the direct approach are likely to be biased. Suppose that one would like to analyze the determinants of underreporting at the firm level with the following regression: U this bias is a priori unknown but will depend on the correlations between X and Z and between X and Z, as well as the size of d. Because we have estimates for both the direct and MIMIC approaches, we can estimate the size and source of the bias for our sample. Including the same regressors as in table 3 in X i and Z i while estimating equations (*) and (**), we find that the estimated b D is not significantly different (no bias) with respect to b M for the industry and location dummies (joint p-value 0.26), but it is significantly different (and Quantiles are defined for sales reported in the survey, and all figures are weighted by sampling weights.
biased) for the other firm characteristics (joint p-value 0.02). This suggests that the direct approach is more appropriate for analyses at higher levels of aggregation, such as at the industry and city levels, in line with the observation that the direct approach might show a ''bias towards the average behavior of other firms in that environment '' (Dabla-Norris & Koeda, 2008) . In sum, the MIMIC approach appears to give a relatively more accurate estimate of underreporting. The indirect approach performs poorly and underestimates underreporting because of being sensitive to measurement errors and underreporting in the survey data. The direct approach gives an estimate of the firm-level average percentage of underreporting, which is somewhat lower than the MIMIC approach, confirming the conjecture of Schneider and Enste (2000) that the direct approach provides a lower bound for true underreporting. However, the direct approach gives too high an estimate for aggregate underreporting because of measurement error and appears less informative on the underreporting of individual firms than the MIMIC approach, and this may create biases in firm-level analyses of underreporting.
What are the practical implications of our findings? First, because the MIMIC approach is often not feasible as it relies on matched firm survey and tax records data, more effort should be made to match (future) survey data with existing tax office (or administrative) data. Second, it is important to put more effort in collecting reliable survey data on sales in shadow economies. One suggestion is to ask firms about a limited number of main products (as was done in the Mongolian survey) rather than about total sales, as in the latter case the firm may be more inclined to report the numbers from the official tax records or to refuse to provide information at all. Third, given that the main differences between the direct and MIMIC approaches are not with respect to industries and cities, analyses using the direct approach should be applied at higher levels of aggregation. Our general finding that firms not only underreport for taxes but also in the survey, however, remains a serious challenge for economic analyses that use firm-level survey data without adequately controlling for possible and systematic underreporting bias (such as in a MIMIC model).
